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Possible Implications of the Cost/Benefit
Analysis Requirement for Regulations
Under the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act
by

RALPH L. STIFFLER KROG*

I. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act' , which was passed on the
last day of the ninety-fifth Congress as Title XX of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, imposes
on the Federal Reserve Board the requirement of performing a costbenefit analysis on any proposed regulations affecting electronic
funds transfer systems. 2 One article has called this requirement
"especially significant as a barometer of changing congressional attitudes toward consumer protection legislation . . .something never
'3
before required in this type of law."
Section 904(a) of the EFT Act 4 requires the Board to make
* B.A. 1976, University of Texas, Austin, Texas. Mr. Krog is in his last year of
law school at Bates College of Law, University of Houston.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (1978 Supp.).
2. Id.

3. Bradell & Olliff, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Primer, 40 OHio ST. L.J.
531, 541 (1979).
4. (a) The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purpose of this
title. In prescribing such regulations, the board shall:
(1) consult with the other agencies referred to in section 917 and take into
account, and allow for, the continuing evolution of electronic banking services and the technology utilized in such services; and
(2) prepare an analysis of economic impact which considers the costs and
benefits to financial institutions, consumers, and other users of electronic
fund transfers, including the extent to which additional documentation, reports, records, and other paper work would be required, and the effects upon
competition in the provision of electronic banking services among large and
small institutions and the availability of such services to different classes of
consumers, particularly low-income consumers;
(3) to the extent practicable, the Board shall demonstrate that the consumer
protections of the proposed regulations outweigh the compliance costs imposed upon consumers and financial institutions;
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three specific evaluations when prescribing EFT regulations. The
first consideration is allowing for the continuing evolution of electronic funds transfer mechanisms. The second is the requirement
that the Board perform a cost-benefit analysis. This analysis must
include the cost of paperwork, the effect that the regulation will
have on smaller financial institutions and their ability to compete,
and the regulation's effects on the availability of services to low-income consumers. The final requirement is that the Board must
show, to the extent possible, that the consumer protections provided
by the regulations outweigh the compliance costs to the financial institution.
These requirements appeared for the first time in a floor amendment proposed by Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, on October
12, 1978-just eight days after the bill was reported favorably out of
committee. 5 Senator Schmitt spoke in favor of these amendments
in the record a
as restraints on unwritten regulations. He included
6
prepared statement of support by Senator Tower.
The economic analysis requirements were written to address
complaints raised by Senators Schmitt, Tower, Morgan, Garn and
Lugar in their dissent from the Senate committee's favorable recom-7
mendation of S. 3499 (the previous Senate version of the EFT Act).
The major objection which these senators voiced in their Additional
Views was that there had been no showing of an abuse or evil requiring congressional action, and therefore, the bill was premature.
A further objection was that the costs of compliance with the Act
could easily outweigh the benefits to consumers and society. Some
of the known costs of the Act and any accompanying regulations
were legal fees for interpretations, retraining of employees, destruction of old forms and-most expensive---computer programming
changes.
Some other fears of premature and overzealous regulations
were that (1) excessive paperwork would impede the development
of new and more efficient payment mechanisms; (2) smaller
financial institutions would be put at a competitive disadvantage;
(3) this would inhibit market entry; (4) higher service charges
would operate to deny low-income consumers easier access to sav(4) any proposed regulations and accompanying analysis shall be sent
promptly to Congress by the Board.
15 U.S.C. § 1693b(a) (1978 Supp.).
5. 124 CONG. REC. S18,144, S18,460.
6. Id. at S18475-76.
7. ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS SCHMrr, TOWER, MORGAN, CARN AND LUGAR,
S. Rep. 1273, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 52 (1978).
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ings accounts; and (5) financial institutions would raise charges on
checking accounts.8 The senators also had specific objections to the
stop-payment mechanism, the error resolution procedure, and the
consumer and criminal liability provisions, among others. However,
it was their fear of excessive regulatory costs and the distortions
that these costs would produce in the competitive financial services
marketplace that resulted in the drafting of section 904(a).
Section 904(a) can be read most easily as a requirement that the
Board perform a balancing test, and that some of the known costs of
regulatory compliance be included as counterweights to the consumer benefits intended by the rules. Since the costs of compliance
must necessarily be passed on to the consumer, the problem facing
the Board is how much protection should the consumer be required
to buy? If the Board sets very high standards and proposes rules
with high compliance costs, then fewer financial institutions will offer EFT services and fewer customers will use them. This will result
in society continuing to foster relatively expensive and inefficient
payment modes. If the Board sets the standards too low, consumers
will suffer from abuses. A careful reading of the section and its legislative history shows that it was the intent of Congress to require the
Board to consider costs, both procedurally by preparing an economic analysis, and substantively by showing that the benefits will
outweigh the costs. 9
II.

POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS

Since there had been no judicial interpretation of section 904(a)
of the EFT Act, it will be necessary to analyze its potential implications by hypothetical example and analogy to other, similar federal
legislation.
Suppose the Federal Reserve Board prescribed rules10 which
adversely affected an entity. Suppose also that the rules were
adopted (or modified) without an accompanying economic analysis,
or that the economic analysis was clearly deficient and therefore the
balance of costs and benefits was clearly an arbitrary decision-at
least from the affected entity's viewpoint. Arguably, the affected
party" would not be without a remedy and could fie suit in federal
court. The issue before the court in this hypothetical case would be
8. Id. at 55.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693b(a) (2) & (3) respectively, reprinted at note 4 supra.
10. Electronic Funds Transfer, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1980).
11. This article does not analyze the question of standing, but assumes that at
least a financial institution subject to these regulations would have standing to maintain such an action. Perhaps a customer of the regulated institution or a class of such
customers would also have standing.
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essentially identical to the issue presented in the numerous cases
brought under the National Environmental Policy Act, 12 i.e.,
whether the court should grant judicial review of the agency's decision, and if so, to what extent should it review the decision?
The cost-benefit analysis requirement incorporated into the EFT
Act is not new in federal legislation. It was first imposed on the
Army Corp of Engineers in the Flood Control Act of 1936.13 Several
other agencies also use it, e.g., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 14 the Soil Conservation Services 15 and the Bureau of Reclamation. 16 Under each of these acts, the costs and benefits are
quantified and compared, with costs as the base unit. If the resulting
ratio is greater than one, then a project-a dam, or a levee-is submitted to Congress for the appropriation of funds, and final ap17
proval.
Prior to society's increased environmental consciousness this
was a fairly straight-forward application of simple economics. The
kinds of factors considered in the cost analysis were the costs of
materials, labor, land and money. The benefits would included hydroelectric power, recreational facilities, navigation, employment,
channelization, soil conservation, land reclamation, and the project's
useful life expectancy. 18 All of these factors are fairly objective and,
though no doubt subject to some disagreement, are all quantifiable.
Congress passed the NEPA in 1969. One of its most important
goals was to "establish specific action-forcing procedures for the implementation of [the new national environmental policy] ."19 The action-forcing procedure is the now famous environmental impact
statement (EIS). Section 102(2) (B) of the NEPA requires federal
agencies to "develop methods and procedures. . . which will insure
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decision-making along
with economic and technical consideration. ' 20 This requirement
meant that the factors to be used in the agency's decision-making
process were no longer objective, and not always quantifiable.
Federal courts were granted judicial review of administrative
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1976) [hereinafter NEPA].
33 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 2133 (1976).
16 U.S.C. § 1003(3) (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 412 (1976).
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1976).
38 Fed. Reg. 24778-869 (1973). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1962a et seq..
F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 1 (1973); emphasis added.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976).
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agency decisions in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).21 A
court can set aside an agency decision if it is "arbitrary, capricious,
22
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
Cost-benefit ratios and how an agency determined them was at one
time considered a strictly legislative function, and the courts refused to review them. 23 This was pre-NEPA, when the factors were

fairly objective. After NEPA and the APA, courts began to look more
closely at the substance of the factors used in agency decisions.
In 1971, Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia circuit said:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long
and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing
courts. For many years, courts have treated administrative policy
decisions with great deference, confining judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On matters of substance, the courts
regularly upheld agency decisions, with a nod in the direction of the
"substantial evidence" tests, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised, the power to set aside agency action on the ground that an
impermissible factor had entered into the decision, or a crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually, however, that power has
come into more frequent use, and with it, the requirement that administrators articulate the factors on which they base their deci24
sions.
While most of the cases which have reviewed cost-benefit analyses have relied upon interpretations of the NEPA,25 all have necessarily rely upon the APA as well. As the United States Supreme
Court said in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe :26
Section 701 of the [APA] provides that the action of each "authority
of Government of the United States" . . . is subject to judicial re-

view except where there is a statutory prohibition on review or
where "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
...This is a very narrow exception,. . . applicable in those rare instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
21. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
22. Id. § 706(2)(A).
23. See cases cited in Comment, Judicial Review of Cost-Benefit Analysis Under
NEPA, 53 NEB. L. REV. 540 (1974); Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Courts, 9 GA. L.

REv. 417 (1975).

24. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
25. See, e.g. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Calvert Cliffs is consistently cited as the first case to recognize a heightened judicial duty to review substantive agency decisions under the
NEPA. See Annot., 17 ALR FED. 1 (1973).
26. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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given case there is no law to apply."'27
As a result, it is fairly certain that federal courts have the power
to review an agency's cost-benefit analysis. However, there is considerable disagreement as to the extent of that review. The two
sides label their positions "procedural review" and "substantive review."' 28 Those favoring procedural review would only require that a
cost-benefit analysis be performed and would not examine the
methods and factors even for reasonableness. Those favoring substantive review would examine the agency's decision on the merits.
The middle ground, if it exists, would permit judicial review of an
agency decision to determine if the methods and factors used in the
cost-benefit analysis were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the balance struck by the agency is within a zone of reasonableness, though it is not the one the court would itself have preferred
it will be sustained, and this is the traditional standard of administrative law. If the agency's decision, or even the decisional approach, is considered by the court to be obtuse or purblind, to be, in
legal terms, outside the zone of reasonableness, the particular
formula of judicial review will not be likely to preclude judicial inhi29
bition or remand.
The only real difficulty would arise when a court, which accepted limited procedural review, refused to consider evidence on
the reasonableness of the factors used in a cost-benefit analysis. In
the past, such refusal has usually been based on the characterization of the cost-benefit analysis as a legislative function.3 0 Such a
characterization, however, is not likely for the EFT Act's economic
analysis since the balancing is done entirely by the agency, i.e.,
there is no need to return to Congress for an appropriation of funds,
and because of Overton Park's interpretation of the APA supporting
3
judicial review of agency decisions. '
27. Id. at 410.
28. Several articles have commented on the scope of judicial review under the
NEPA. See Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Judicial Review, and the National Environmental Policy Act, ENVIRONMENTAL L. REV. 363 (1977); Note The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L REv. 735 (1975).
See also F. ANDERSON, note 19 supra.
29. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 12 U.
PA. L. REV. 509, 529 (1974).
30. Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Kickapoo River), 345 F. Supp. 440 (W.D. Wis. 1972),
affd on other grounds, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1974); Warm Springs Task Force v. Gribble (Warm Springs Dam), 375 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Froehlke (Cache River), 473 F.2d 346, 356 (8th Cir. 1972).
31. Another reason that courts refused to review cost-benefit ratios in NEPA
cases was the debate over whether the NEPA requires inclusion of a formal cost-benefit ratio in the EIS. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974) is a lead-
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Another reason not to expect such a characterization is because
the economic analysis is the action-forcing requirement of the EFT
Act, similar to the EIS in the NEPA. Clearly, a court has the obligation to grant review when someone claims that the Federal Reserve
Board has not complied with the Act's requirements.
In its last statement on the subject, the United States Supreme
Court limited the scope of judicial review in a way that may seriously handicap one who desires to challenge an economic analysis
as the basis for a regulation. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resource Council, Inc. ,32 the Court held that
federal courts do not have the power to review and overturn agency
rule-making proceedings on the basis of the use vel non of a procedural device by the agency, where the agency at least met the statutory minimum. The Court was interpreting the affect of the APA and
NEPA on agency rule-making proceedings.
Rule-making proceedings could probably be distinguished from
environmental impact statements, cost-benefit analyses, and agency
decisions to proceed with construction of a project, which are the
proceedings usually under attack in NEPA cases. The clear requirement in the EFT Act of an economic analysis, to the extent of listing
factors to be included, might very well give the judiciary expanded
scope in determining the necessary statutory minimum. Unfortunately, the EFT Act specifies that the economic analysis is to be
done as part of the rule-making procedure.
When courts in NEPA cases have examined the agency's costbenefit analysis, they have occasionally found serious defects. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority (Tellico
Dam I),33 the court complained that the cost-benefit analysis "consist[ed] almost entirety of unsupported conclusions." 34 In Montgomery v. Ellis35 the trial court found that on a very marginal
project (cost-benefit ratio of 1.5 to 1), the agency had used an arbitrarily low interest rate, an inflated project life span (twice the
agency's usual (life span), and was claiming recreational benefits for
lakes that would not be accessible to the public. These examples illustrate the possibility that courts will examine the methods and the
ing case which held that a formal cost-benefit analysis was not required in an EIS.
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm' v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971) is the leading case for the opposite conclusion.
32. 435 U.S. 519 (1977).
33. 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
34. Id. at 809.
35. 364 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Ala. 1973). See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke (Wallisville
Project), 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. II

factors used by the Federal Reserve Board in its EFT cost-benefit
analysis when it is challenged as arbitrary.
HI.

EFFECT OF THE REQUIREMENT

Prior to launching an attack on the Board's rules and regulations, one must understand how the Board is to proceed under the
Act. The Board interprets its cost-benefit analysis obligation as follows:
Section 904(a) (2) of the Act requires the Board to prepare an analysis of the economic impact of the regulations that the Board issues
to implement the Act . . . The analysis must consider the costs
and benefits of the regulation to suppliers and users of EFT services, the effects of the regulation on competition in the provision of
electronic fund transfer services among large and small financial institutions, and the effects of the regulation on the availability of
EFT services to different
classes of consumers, particularly low-in36
come consumers.

Note that the Board does not believe it necessary to produce a
numerical cost-benefit ratio. Even a cursory glance at the economic
analysis, however, will reveal that the Board is quite conscious of
costs, market effect, alternative procedures for compliance and comments on proposed rules. Rather than attempting to examine all of
the regulations, this section will focus on one provision, the documentation requirement of pre-authorized transfers to a customer's
account.

37

Section 906(b) of the Act 38 requires a financial institution to
provide positive or negative notice to the consumer for any pre-authorized deposits (e.g., the direct deposit of a Social Security or payroll check), unless the payor provides such notice. Prior to the EFT
Act, the Treasury Department was engaged in the direct deposit of
Social Security checks without providing monthly notice to the beneficiaries, primarily because of the cost of such notice. One report
estimated the cost at 17c per transaction or $25 million annually. 39 A
plain reading of the Act requires the financial institution to give notice, not the government. The Board found itself with the obligation
of regulating this practice.
The first proposed regulation appeared as a choice of one of five
36. 44 Fed. Reg. 18,468, 18,474 (1979). The Board goes on to point out that the analysis assumes no economic impact if the regulations are less restrictive than current
industry practice or state law. Id..
37. 12 C.F.R. § 205.10 (a).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1693d(b) (1978 Supp.).
39. 45 Fed. Reg. 8,261 (1980).
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alternatives. 40 The least expensive of these choices was provision
for telephone notice whenever a consumer requested it. This service
was one that almost all financial institutions already provided.
The next version made several changes. 4 1 The Board dropped
one alternative as too burdensome (notice only on overdraft), and
modified the telephone notice option to require the financial institution to inform the customer of his right to receive written notice,
permitting the consumer to choose the form of notice. Under this option, the financial institution was permitted to impose a "reasonable" charge for paper notice. The proposed regulation also added
an interpretation that a pay slip would be sufficient'notice for the direct deposit of paychecks.
The final rule was adopted and the economic impact analysis
was published on January 30, 1980.42 The board obviously had been

influenced by the results of the economic impact analysis. The analysis concluded that the cost of notice to financial institutions would
be at least 20c per transaction, or $29 million annually. The cost to
the government would be lower due to economies of scale. "The cost
of providing positive or negative notice would substantially eliminate the benefit of automatic direct deposit systems because the
cost of the notices would
exceed the savings from not producing and
'43
mailing paper checks.
The final rule provides for either positive or negative written notice, or telephone notice. The financial institution, not the consumer,
has the option of which method to use, because otherwise each
financial institution would have to be prepared to provide all possible methods. The consumer cannot demand paper notice. Essentially the Board returned to the status quo that existed prior to
enactment of the EFT Act.
The Board had another source of information on the economic
impact of this regulation, namely the comments of the financial institutions on the proposed rule. They stated that if the proposal was
adopted, they would withdraw from the direct deposit program, and
40. The alternatives are (i) sending notice whenever a transaction occurs; (ii)
sending notice whenever a regularly scheduled transaction does not occur; (iii) using
the monthly statement as notice if it is mailed within two days of the transaction; (iv)
providing a telephone number which the customer can call to determine if the transaction took place; (v) sending notice only when failure of the transaction to occur
causes an overdraft but the institution must pay all items presented (to limit of the
amount of the scheduled item) and cannot charge for the overdraft. 44 Fed. Reg.
25,862 (1979); 12 C.F.R § 205.8(c)(1)(i)-(v) (proposed).
41. 44 Fed. Reg. 59,479 (1979).
42. 45 Fed. Reg. 8,238 (1980).
43. Id. at 8,261.
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force the government to spend the millions of dollars to mail checks
directly to the recipients.4
The Board used its broad powers to make the regulation less
costly than the Act, on its face, would seem to require. Had the
Board not modified its earlier proposal, the direct deposit program
would have been in jeopardy. The economic impact analysis gave
the Board the information it needed to make the necessary decision.
Throughout the rule-making process the Board's concern with compliance costs was reflected in its comments. 45 The factors on which
the board based its decision were clearly articulated, and appear
quite sound, considering the difficulty of the task facing the Board.
Each time EFTA or Regulation E requires a [financial institution]
to make a disclosure, send a notice, or undertake some other procedure, an associated cost occurs. Conversely omission of that action
commensurately reduces the protection enjoyed by EFT consumers. The financial institution and the consumer play a zero-sum
game. What one gains the other must lose. This largely leaves the
FRB [the Board] in a political cross-fire between
Congress and the 46
adversary parties.
IV.

CONCLUSION

An economic impact analysis requirement for regulatory agencies is a salutory feature. It makes the agency cognizant of the adverse effects of its regulations as well as their benefits. If the
purpose of the requirement was to make the Federal Reserve Board
aware of the regulatory compliance costs, then it has clearly succeeded. The requirement has forced the agency to look for the least
costly alternative. Throughout the commentary on the proposed and
final notice rules, it was apparent that the Board was engaged in
such a search. 47 The economic impact analysis was the determining
factor between alternative proposals, or it seemed to be. On several
occasions, the Board requested cost estimates for proposed rules
from the industry, and sometimes complained when it got no response.4 The analysis done by the Board's Division of Research
and Statistics was probably the Board's only unbiased source of information. Public commentators on proposed rules have been accu44. Id. at 8,254.
45. Id. at 8,248-65.
46. Hsia, Legislative History and Proposed Regulatory Implementation of the
Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 13 U.S.F.L. REv. 229, 307 (1979).
47. See note 45 supra.

48. 44 Fed. Reg. 18,475 (1978). Pages 18,474-19 contain the economic impact analysis for the rules regarding the issuance of access devices (plastic, magnetic strip

cards).
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rately categorized as adversaries. 49
The analysis to be done under the EFT Act is relatively easy, or
at least it is objective, even if difficult to determine.5 0 Compare the
task of the Board's Research Division with that facing an agency attempting to quantify environmental costs and benefits. In the EFT
Act's analysis an agency is required to determine what something
costs in dollars and cents, not in aesthetic values. What the Board is
asked to do is possible, though often complex. Due to the reasonableness of the Board's decisions and the clarity of its articulated
reasons, it is unlikely that anyone would choose to attack one of the
regulations in court. If, however, the Board's analysis and decisions
had not been sufficient, had left out one of the specifically required
considerations, e.g., disparate impact on small institutions, or if the
Board had not met the statutory minimum, then one could mount an
attack using the standard of review set forth in the APA with the
NEPA cases as analogy.

49. Hsia, supra note 46, at 307.
50. See id. at 307-08. See also Glassman, Economic Impact Analysis of §§ 909 &
911, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,937 (1978).

